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1. INTRODUCTION
In his paper, Cathal Woods deals both with the linguistic devices that critics may use
to express their rejection of and objections to what an arguer has put forward, and
with the way in which we can visualize such rejections and objections in a diagram. I
am very much sympathetic to both of Woods’ projects, because, in my view,
argumentation is a co-production of a proponent (arguer, protagonist) and an
opponent (critic, antagonist), in the sense that the proponent’s argumentation can
best be understood as the result of a dialogue in which the proponent responds to
the critical reactions of the opponent who examines the proponent’s position.
Consequently, to make progress in the study of argumentation, we need to have a
clear grasp of the various ways of criticism, as well as of the ways to analyze and
evaluate them. In addition to a number of critical remarks regarding some of Woods’
specific proposals, I shall attempt to contribute to the debate by adding some
related ideas.
2. COMMENTS ON THE LANGUAGE OF REJECTION AND OBJECTION
What Woods labels “rejection” and “disagreement,” I would label a “critical
reaction.” As I understand Woods, he distinguishes between the various types of
critical reaction by taking three parameters into account: first, the illocutionary
force of a critical reaction; second, the propositional focus of a critical reaction; third,
the norm that a critical reaction appeals to.
First, he distinguishes between on the one hand doubt, examples of which
would be “Really?” or “Why do you think that?”, and on the other hand dismissals,
and denials, where the critic adopts a counter-standpoint of her own, such as “No!”
The difference, I suppose, has to do with the differences in illocutionary force, for
the reason that doubts seems to be associated with – what Searle labeled –
directives, such as posing a question or making a request for an argument, whereas
dismissals and denials seem to be associated with – what Searle called – assertives,
such as denying something the proponent said, and thereby advancing a counterstandpoint of her own.
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Second, Woods distinguishes between various critical reactions by taking
their propositional focus into account. Some question or deny a premise, whereas
others focus on the argumentative connection.
Third, Woods characterizes an objection as a critical reaction “which
indicates the nature of B’s criticism of what A has said.” In this way the opponent, in
my terminology, specifies and makes explicit the norm that she appeals to. In
Woods’ examples, the objection either appeals to a norm to the effect that an
argument is valid or at least sufficient strong, or to a norm to the effect that the
premises used are true or acceptable. In my view, each critical reaction appeals to
one norm or other, so even a simple challenge can be seen as appealing to the
burden of proof rule, in that the message is that if the proponent will not answer
adequately, his burden of proof will not be seen as having been discharged. Further,
there is a wide range of dialogical norms that can be appealed to in criticism. The
opponent might appeal to any rule for critical discussion, such as the language use
rule, by pointing out that some phrase used by the proponent is insufficiently clear.
Or she might appeal to an institutional rule, such as when a lawyer points out that
the evidence, though extremely convincing in its own right, has not been obtained in
an admissible way. Or she might appeal to an optimality rule, to the effect that –
though complying with all the rules for critical discussion- the argumentation is not
up to standard, for example by not being very persuasive, or by not being efficiently
phrased, and so forth.
In addition to these three parameters for characterizing a particular type of
critical reaction, a fourth could be added. Fourthly, one could indicate whether a
critical reaction contributes to, on the one hand the ground level of dialogue, where
the proponent and the opponent exchange arguments and requests for arguments,
thereby co-producing the proponent’s argumentation, or to a meta-level of dialogue,
a dialogue about a dialogue, in which the participants deal with the strategic quality
of a previous move, or with the dialectical or institutional legitimacy of a previous
move. A fallacy charge, for example, initiates such a meta-dialogue, just like a
strategic remark such as “Wouldn’t it be better to support your position by way of a
utilitarian argument, rather than that deontic one you just gave me?” In my view
these four parameters –norm, level, force and focus- need, in the end, to be fully
exploited in any systematic classification of types of criticism (see, Krabbe & Van
Laar, 2011).
What makes Woods’ project especially worthwhile is his interest in the
ambiguity of criticism. His examples make it clear that some phrases for expressing
a critical reaction allow, within their context of utterance, of more than one reading,
because it has not been made sufficiently precise what the intended propositional
focus of the criticism is. But then, each of the parameters may give rise to ambiguity.
As to force, the critical reaction may be ambiguous for leaving it unclear whether the
opponent is making a counter-assertion, or whether she is just firmly requesting for
argument: “S? No!” As to norm, the critical reaction may be unclear for leaving it
unclear whether the opponent appeals to the burden of proof rule, on the ground
that this, apparently, cannot be proven, or some optimality rule, on the ground that
this is unconvincing: “You can’t say this.” As to level, the criticism may be unclear for
leaving it unclear whether it contributes to the ground level dialogue, by inviting the
2

JAN ALBERT VAN LAAR
proponent to offer a further argument, or to a meta-level dialogue, for example by
inviting the proponent to revise his strategy or to withdraw an illegitimate move:
“That’s utter nonsense!” The normative question that these ambiguous criticisms
raise is: What if the proponent interprets the critical reaction different from was
intended by the opponent, or in a way that happens to be unwelcome to her, and he
develops an argument, on that basis, that happens to be flawed, in the opponent’s or
in the analyst’s eyes? Then, I surmise, the flaws in that argument are at least in part
to be attributed to the opponent.
In my final remark about the language of rejection and objection, I want to
point out the importance of – what can be called – “counter-considerations” (Van
Laar & Krabbe, 2012), which are those propositions with which the opponent
motivates her critical stance, and thereby explains to the proponent why she is
critical towards some assertion on his side, as well as informs him about what kind
of strategy he should use in order to take away her critical doubts. These counterconsiderations can be seen as reasons, and thereby they are close to dismissals and
objections. But different from expressing a counter-standpoint, that brings a burden
of proof when challenged by the proponent, a counter-consideration does not
constitute genuine argumentation. For, it is not an attempt to convince the
proponent on the basis of what he is willing to concede. Rather, they are motivations
that the proponent can take into account in order to device an argument that he can
use in order to take away the specific doubts by the opponent regarding his position.
In other words, the opponent does not have a burden of proof regarding counterconsideration, but it remains up to the proponent to refute them. Thus, a critic might
put forward highly informative criticism, without committing herself to the truth of
the information, and yet steering the proponent’s argumentation in a particular
direction: “Why should we take a dog? As far as you’ve shown, a dog would add
expense” (cf. Rescher on cautious assertion, discussed in Van Laar & Krabbe, 2013).
3. COMMENTS ON DIAGRAMMING REJECTION AND OBJECTION
Woods’ second project about diagramming rejection and objection is important, for
it concerns the relation between the dialogical process in which the participants, as
it were, co-produce the proponent’s argumentation, and the final result or product
of that process. Traditional diagrams are to be seen as the result of such
argumentative exchange, and I agree with him that it would be very interesting to
visualize the specific ways in which that result is partly generated by critical
reactions of the interlocutor.
A first comment on Woods’ specific proposal to diagram objections is to
indicate the existence of a similar technique, not mentioned in his paper, that is used
in computational dialectic, where defeat-relations between arguments and
propositions are diagrammed (see for example, Pollock, 2010).
A second comment deals with the dialogical information already contained
within the conventional diagramming techniques within argumentation theory, and
within the pragma-dialectical method of reconstructing the argumentation structure
in particular. As I read these argument diagrams, they do not merely diagram
propositional relations in the abstract, but rather, propositional relations such that
3
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if the opponent accepts the starting points she must withdraw her doubts regarding
the conclusion. And therefore, these diagrams can be understood as already
containing quite some information about the opponent’s critical reactions, albeit
only as understood or as taken into account by the proponent. I shall deal with the
various components of these diagrams, as used in the pragma-dialectical method, in
turn: the arrow, the ampersand, the plus-sign, the circled plus-sign. What do they
express, given the dialogical understanding of argumentation as a series of
responses to a series of critical reactions?
An arrow pointing from premise A to (intermediate) conclusion B symbolizes
a single attempt by the proponent to convince the opponent, and can thus be seen as
expressing that the proponent either responds to a request for an argument, focused
on proposition B, or that he anticipates such criticism. In other words, the arrow
expresses that A is a response to a criticism of the form “Why B?”. We could include
the criticism taken into account by adding a label to the arrow, containing the
specific form that the criticism had. And if the opponent chose to accompany her
challenge, “Why would I accept that John is Mary’s father?””, with a counterconsideration, “As far as you’ve shown, nobody vouches for it!” (“Counter C”), this
could be added to the label. As a result, the propositions that the opponent puts
forward are not treated as reasons to convince the proponent, but their status as
mere counter-considerations to be taken into account by the proponent is visualized
by writing them on these labels.

Figure 1
Suppose opponent Olga would make a somewhat more radical choice, and chose to
act herself as a second proponent, defending a counter-standpoint. Then, she must,
of course, be seen as developing an argumentation of her own, responding to or
anticipating criticism by her interlocutor Pierre – the former proponent now in the
role of a second opponent. Therefore, a mixed discussion merits two separate
diagrams. Of course, in so-far as the counter-argumentation by Olga expresses
criticism towards Pierre’s argument, it must be taken into account in Pierre’s
argument diagram by substantiating the labels with counter-considerations. Dual
functions, such as discussed by Woods, then are only visualized by the fact that the
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same proposition figures both in the argumentation diagram by Pierre (as a
counter-consideration) as well as the one by Olga (as a premise in her
argumentation), or vice versa.
The ampersand, &, symbolizes that two (or more) reasons, A and B,
constitute the support of a single argumentation in favor of a conclusion C, and if the
proponent’s expresses A first, and B second, then B can be seen as understood as a
response to a critical reaction to the effect that it remains unclear how premise A
can be used to convince the opponent of C. This kind of critical reaction could thus
be attached to the ampersand with a label. If the critical reaction is accompanied
with a counter-consideration, that could be included as well. Thus, if the
proponent’s standpoint is that John is Mary’s father, and his first reason reads “Well,
John is male,” then the opponent might challenge the connection between premise
and conclusion saying “Why would I accept that John is Mary’s father on account of
him being male?”, possibly accompanied by a counter-consideration “He might just
be a friend!” One possible reaction for the proponent, them, is to add the link
between premise and conclusion, saying “Well, John is one of Mary’s parents,” thus
completing his single argumentation. (Of course, he could add novel evidence as
well, in which case a different argumentation structure would arise.)

Figure 2
The plus-sign symbolizes that the premise to the right of it supplements the
premise(s) to its left, so that the same attempt at persuasion becomes a stronger
one. Thus, it anticipates, or responds to a critical reaction in which the opponent
requests for a strengthening of the earlier argumentation: “What more do you have
to go on?” or “These reasons do not suffice, so you might want to supplement them.”
Again, this critical reaction can be fixed to the plus-sign.
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Figure 3
Finally, a similar story can be told about the circled plus-sign, which is made to
represent situations where the proponent responds to, or anticipates specific
counter-considerations (“objections,” as they are referred to in the pragmadialectical theory). So, according to this theory, this symbol always requires the
mentioning of a counter-consideration. For example, if the proponent defends his
standpoint that John is Mary’s father by saying that John said himself that he is her
father, and the opponent counters that as far as she knows they do look alike, the
proponent is, as it were, invited to refute this counter-consideration by saying, for
example, that they do look alike (which of course, may need further support).

Figure 4
To conclude my second comment, a diagram of just the argumentation of the
proponent already conveys much information about the criticism that drove the
proponent to developing this very argumentation, and diagramming techniques
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might take this into account, and visualize the driving force of the opponent’s critical
moves. Note, that if argumentation is the result of reasoning with more than one
opponent, the specific agents can be specified in the criticism-labels.
There is one shortcoming of my counter-proposal: It only visualizes the
specific manner in which the proponent takes criticism into account. Some of
Woods’ techniques are still needed in order to show criticisms that have not, or not
yet, been taken into account, and they might be useful to represent critical reactions
regardless of the specific way the proponent chooses them to deal with.
Note, however, that I am not convinced that dashed arrows that do not start
from a specific proposition (“formal objections”) have been visualized well by
Woods’ system. For, as Woods says, a dashed arrow represents that “x is a reason
for not accepting y,” and that does not lead to a result that is comprehensible if x is
not replaced by a specific proposition. If he would mean something like “There
exists some proposition x such that x is a reason against y,” then, I surmise, this
amounts to a kind of meta-dialogical way of arguing that merits a separate
treatment.
4. CONCLUSION
Woods’ article contributes in many interesting ways to the theory of criticism, and
in my commentary I have only dealt with some of the basic points of his approach,
trying especially to connect it with the kind of work in formal dialectic that I have
been involved in myself. My main point for the further development of such a theory
of criticism, is that it ought to do justice to the kind of dialogue in which an
opponent puts forward highly informative criticism, yet without adopting herself
any counter-standpoint. This would further clarify the basic notion of a critical
discussion (or a persuasion dialogue, for that matter), by fully exploiting the
dialectical asymmetry of a defending proponent and a critically examining
opponent.
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